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Abstract
Background: In recent years, avian influenza viruses (AIVs) have seriously threatened human health. Questions
such as: why do AIVs infect humans?, how quickly can an AIV become pandemic?, and which virus is the most
dangerous? cannot be sufficiently answered using current bioinformatic studies.
Method: Secondary structures and energies of representative 5′-untranslated region (UTR) of the HA gene were
calculated. Then their secondary structures and energies were re-calculated after one or two nucleotide substitutions
were introduced into the HA 5′-UTR. Phylogenetic trees on the basis of hemagglutinin (HA) and polymerase basic
protein 2 (PB2) amino acid sequences and HA 5′-UTR nucleotide sequences were constructed. The connection
between the energy and translation efficiency of 5′-UTR was confirmed by in vitro coupled transcription/translation
assay.
Results: The simplicity of the secondary structure of the 5′-UTR of the HA gene determines the overall virus
replication rate and transmission potential. Point mutation assays show that the 5′-UTR sequences of the HA gene
in the influenza subtypes H2N2, H3N2, and H7N9 have greater variation potentials than other virus subtypes.
Conclusion: Some high-virulent strains of avian influenza might emerge in the next two to three years. The H2N2
subtype, once disappeared in humans, may stage a comeback. The current outbreak of H7N9 may become
pandemic and cause even more deaths, if one or two bases are substituted in the 5′-UTR sequence of the HA gene.
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Background
During the past decade, an endless stream of avian influ-
enza viruses (AIVs), including H1N1, H5N1, and H7N9,
has emerged, leading to humans developing malignant re-
spiratory diseases. The variation trend of influenza viruses
needs to be urgently studied. In 1918, the Spanish flu,
which was later confirmed as the H1N1 influenza virus,
caused at least 20 million deaths worldwide (incomplete
statistic) [1, 2]. Why was the Spanish flu so dangerous,
and is there a possibility that there could be another
outbreak like this in the future? These questions cannot
be sufficiently answered using the current studies. In this
paper, we attempt to answer these questions using new
bioinformatic systems.
The hemagglutinin (HA) protein of the influenza sub-
types that can infect humans preferentially recognizes
α-2,6-linked sialic acids (SAs) (humanlike receptors),
whereas the HA of avian influenza subtypes preferentially
recognizes α-2,3-linked SAs (avian-like receptors). The
alanine residue at position 160 (160A) in the H1N1 or
H5N1 HA leads to an absence of glycosylation at positions
158 to 160 in HA, and permits virus binding to α-2,6-
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linked SAs [3–6]. Alternatively, a Leu→Gln mutation at
position 226 (226L) in H7N9 HA changes the HA protein
structure to exhibit a dual receptor-binding property
[7, 8]. Either 160A in H1N1/H5N1 HA or 226L in
H7N7/H7N9 (may also include H5N1) HA [9] may result
in an influenza virus that can infect humans (mammals);
N186K [5], G186V [5], or G228S [5, 7] in the HA protein
structure may do the same thing.
Amino acid substitutions in basic polymerase (PB)
proteins have been shown to be major determinants of a
host’s range and transmission [10]. Whereas avian viruses,
in principle, replicate at temperatures of around 41 °C
(the temperature of the intestinal tract of birds), for repli-
cation in humans, viruses need to adapt to 33 °C (the
temperature of the human upper respiratory tract, URT).
The amino acid substitution Glu627→ Lys627 (E627K) in
the polymerase complex protein PB2 has been associated
with increased virus replication in mammalian cells at
lower temperatures [11–14]. Amino acid substitutions
D701N or S590G/R591Q in PB2 yield a similar phenotype
to E627K [15]. However, the relationship between muta-
tions of D701N/S590G/R591Q and their virulence is not
clear for naturally occurring AIVs.
The above-mentioned genetically modified H5N1 or
H5N1 hybrid viruses carrying 2009/H1N1 virus genes
may cause airborne transmission. However, the transmis-
sion capability and virulence of artificial AIVs made in
laboratories have been recorded as very low [5, 6, 12, 13].
We still do not know how far and how long a naturally
occurring AIV would have to last to become pandemic.
Previous phylogenetic analyses have suggested the origins
and diversities of viruses [2, 14], however, these data were
not generally related to the pathogenicity/transmissibility
of AIVs. We still do not know which virus is the most
dangerous.
In this paper, we introduce a new idea of a third pre-
requisite to airborne transmission: the simplicity of the
secondary structure of the 5′-untranslated region (UTR)
sequence of the HA gene, which may determine the
overall virus replication and transmission rates. Through
comprehensive analysis, we deduced that H2N2 might
re-emerge, and that the current outbreak of H7N9 may
become pandemic and cause even more deaths.
Methods
Retrieval and alignment of sequences
All sequences were acquired from the National Center for
Biotechnology Information (http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov).
One hundred 5′-UTR sequences of representative H1N1,
H2N2, H3N2, H5N1, H7N7, H7N9, H9N2, and H10N8
HA mRNAs were collected. Sampling criteria for each
subtype— viruses from the three major hosts (avian, swine,
and human influenza), and one or two other hosts—were
collected if available (the majority of sequences were from
the human host). Sequences of the viruses from different
decades and different continents were collected. Some of
the 5′-UTR sequences in the database were shorter than
43 bp, and so they were filled up to 40 bp. This was done
by comparing them with homologous sequences from
the same virus subtype, and then doing DNA sequence
alignment using ClustalX 2.1 (http://www.clustal.org/)
[16]. Alignment to 20 representative amino acid sequences
(see Additional file 2: Table S1) was performed using
ClustalX 2.1 [16].
Prediction of 5′-UTR secondary structure
Secondary structures and energies of 60 5′-UTR se-
quences of HA mRNAs of AIVs (see Additional file 2:
Table S2) were calculated using the latest version of
RNADraw 1.1b2 (updated on June 18, 2012; http://
www.rnadraw.com) [17], which can calculate structure
energies of RNA structures with dangling ends. While
running RNADraw, the temperature was set at 33 °C,
taking into consideration that a relatively minor change
in temperature (32–39 °C) would lead to a perturbation
in the RNA structure [18]. When running the software,
the option “use dangling end energies” was unchecked,
but the “structure is part of multiloop” option was
checked. The secondary structures and energies of rep-
resentative 5′-UTR sequences were re-calculated after
one or two nucleotide substitutions (both transversions
and transitions were introduced).
In vitro transcription/translation coupled reactions
Seven representative 40 bp 5′-UTR sequences (including
two nucleotide substitutions) were introduced between
the T7 promoter and the Luciferase template. Then, the
in vitro transcription/translation coupled reaction was
performed using the TNT® T7 Coupled Reticulocyte
Lysate System (Promega BioSystems Sunnyvale Inc.,
Sunnyvale, CA, USA). After incubating at 33 °C for eight
hours, luciferase activity was monitored using a GloMax®
20/20 Luminometer, following the manufacturer’s instruc-
tions (Promega) [19]. All assays were repeated three times,
and the typical results shown with standard deviations
(± SD). The Student’s t-test was performed for all data.
P-values of 0.05 were considered significant.
Phylogenetic analyses of HA and PB2 5′-UTR sequences
Hemagglutinin and polymerase basic protein 2 (PB2)
amino acid sequences and 5′-UTR HA nucleotide se-
quences were aligned using ClustalX 2.1 [16]. Gaps result-
ing from the alignment were treated as missing data. Each
phylogenetic tree was constructed using MEGA 6.0.5
(www.megasoftware.net), and employing the maximum-
likelihood estimation, the JTT model, and 1,000 bootstrap
replications [20].
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Results
Mutations in HA and PB2 proteins
Hemagglutinin and PB2 protein sequences from 20 repre-
sentative viruses (including the 1918 H1N1; see Additional
file 2: Table S1) were aligned (see Fig. 1). Both the HA-
160A and PB2-627K mutations were observed in the 1918
H1N1 subtype, thus possibly explaining its widespread
dissemination. Both these mutations were also observed
in the Nagasaki/07 N020/2008(H1N1) and swine/Shan-
dong/1123/2008(H1N1) subtypes, thus explaining the high
mortality rate of the 2008–2009 H1N1 flu pandemic, which
killed around one in 10 people [21]. The HA-160A
and PB2-627K mutations were also observed in the
Cambodia/408008/2005(H5N1) subtype, thus the virus
could lead to limited human-to-human transmission, and
become much more dangerous than the Hong-Kong/213/
2003(H5N1) subtype, which has neither of these two
mutations. The PB2-627K mutation was not observed in
the less-virulent strain California/21/2011(H1N1). Neither
the HA-160A nor the HA-226L mutations were observed
in the 1957 Asian flu (H2N2) or the 1968 Hong Kong flu
(H3N2) subtypes, but the HA-186V and the PB2-627K
mutations were observed, making them high-virulent
strains [2]. The current outbreak of seasonal H3N2 can
also infect humans [2], however neither the 160A, 186 V,
nor 226L mutations have been observed in this subtype’s
HA proteins, leading us to deduce that HA proteins may
bind human receptors independent of these mutations. It
is noteworthy that the HA-226L mutation has been
observed in the majority of H7-type influenzas (see Fig. 1)
[7, 8, 14], and therefore they might potentially infect
humans. The HA-226L and PB2-627K mutations have
both been observed in the Shanghai/02/2013(H7N9) sub-
type, thus leading to limited human-to-human transmis-
sions of some H7N9 virus strains [7]. Contrastingly, the
PB2-627K mutation has not been observed in the 2003
H7N7 subtype, thus only a few cases of human infections
have been reported [22]. The HA-186V but not the PB2-
627K mutation has been observed in the H9N2 subtype,
while PB2-627K but not the HA-186V mutation has been
observed in the H10N8 subtype. This means the potential
of these strains to infect humans is relatively low.
Secondary structure analysis of the 5′-UTR sequence of
the HA gene
The third requirement for efficient human-to-human
transmission is for sufficient virus particles to be carried
in the respiratory droplet. For example, H5N1 is usually
Fig. 1 Alignment of HA and PB2 amino acid sequences from 20 representative AIVs (important mutation sites are marked with red boxes)
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replicated in the lower region of the human respiratory
tract, where the avian virus receptor is prevalent [23].
Meanwhile, seasonal influenza virus replicates in the
upper region of the respiratory tract, and could be easily
spread by sneezing and coughing [23].
Thus, AIVs need other factors to get sufficient virus
particles in the respiratory droplet. Generally, approxi-
mately 500 HA and 100 neuraminidase (NA) spikes are
distributed on the flu virus particle surface [24], making
HA one of the most abundant proteins of the virus
particle. Its synthesis may be the rate-limiting step of the
whole virus particle assembly. There are many other
proteins regulating the virus replication rate, such as
non-structural protein 1 and the nucleic export protein
[25]. However, they might be less important than HA in
determining the overall virus replication rate.
A previous study suggested that a single nucleotide
substitution in the 5′-UTR of a RNA molecule, where
the elimination of the mismatch stabilizes the initiator
helix by −3.6 kcal/mol, would lead to a 500-time decrease
in its translation rate [26]. Therefore, we presume that the
structure of the 5′-UTR of HA plus-strand RNA deter-
mines the HA protein translation efficiency [27], as well
as the whole virus replication efficiency.
One hundred representative HA 5′-UTR sequences
from avian, swine, and human hosts were collected, and
their secondary structures and energies were analyzed
(see Fig. 2 and Additional file 2: Table S2). Most 5′-UTR
sequences of H1N1 viruses have high energies (3.7–
5.0 kcal), which means their secondary structures are
relatively simple (less hairpins or branches). Correspond-
ingly, the seasonal H1N1 subtype is the most pandemic
Fig. 2 Secondary structures and energies of HA 5′-UTR from 12 representative AIVs (energy unit is kcal/mol)
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influenza with the largest potential for transmission to
humans [28]. The HA 5′-UTR of the 1957 H2N2 sub-
type has a slightly lower structure energy (1.3–1.6 kcal),
but the HA 5′-UTR of the current H2N2 subtype has an
energy as high as the H1N1. The human H3N2 subtype
has a much lower energy (0.1–0.9 kcal), so it’s not as
widespread as the H1N1 [28]. The energies of HA 5′-UTR
sequences of most H5N1 subtypes are low (0.12 kcal). The
H7N9 1988 and 2008 subtypes, and all types of H7N7 also
have low energies (0.12 kcal). It is noteworthy that the 5′-
UTR HA of the 2013 H7N9 subtype has a relatively higher
energy of (1.11 kcal), although only three substitutions of
bases occurred after 2008. Accordingly, a sudden outbreak
of novel H7N9 influenza was reported in 2013 [7, 8]. The
HA 5′-UTR sequences of H9N2 subtypes have the lowest
energies, therefore, their translation efficiency should be
relatively low. The 5′-UTR sequences of the H10N8 sub-
type HA mRNA in the current database are shorter than
20 bp, so they were not calculated.
Variation potentials of HA 5′-UTR sequences
The energies pertaining to 5′-UTR sequences of the 1957
H2N2 and 1968 H3N2 HA subtypes are much lower than
those observed in the current outbreaks. They seem to be
constantly slowly replicated. However, these sequences
were not taken from patients, but from sub-inoculated
materials (e.g., mouse lungs or egg-passages) [29]. The 5′-
UTR may vary during these sub-inoculations. To know
the potential variations of the HA 5′-UTR, point muta-
tions were introduced into the sequences. For example, a
-36G→C mutation in HA 5′-UTR of the Singapore/1/
1957(H2N2) subtype increased the energy from 1.57 to
5.53 kcal; a -35C→G mutation resulted in an energy of
4.51 kcal; a -29U→A mutation resulted in an energy of
4.51 kcal; and the -36G→C and -29U→A double
mutation resulted in the highest energy of 8.61 kcal
(almost all hairpin or branch structures were eliminated;
see Fig. 3). Regarding the Aichi/2-MA/1968(H3N2) sub-
type, a -37U→A mutation in HA 5′-UTR increased the
energy from 0.13 to 3.02 kcal; a -35U→A mutation
resulted in an energy of 3.44 kcal; a -16G→C mutation
resulted in an energy of 3.2 kcal; and a -35U→A and
-16G→C double mutation resulted in an energy of
3.68 kcal (see Fig. 3). Thus, the original structures of the
HA 5′-UTR sequences of the 1957 H2N2 and 1968 H3N2
subtypes might be very simple (with high energies),
therefore replicating very quickly and potentially killing
thousands of people [2].
The HA 5′-UTR of the Indonesia/5/2005(H5N1) sub-
type can achieve a maximum energy level of 2.12 kcal
(-8C→G or -7U→A), much lower than that of the
H7N9 subtype. Human H5N1 infections largely declined
after 2005. However, in the HA 5′-UTR of the Jiangsu/
2/2013(H7N9) subtype, a -37U→A mutation increased
the energy from 1.11 to 2.54 kcal; a -31U/-29U→A muta-
tion increased it to 2.04 kcal; a -14G/-9G→C mutation
increased it to 2.56 kcal; and the -37U→A and −31→ to
A double mutation resulted in the highest energy of
4.06 kcal (see Fig. 3). Thus, the H7N9 subtype may be-
come pandemic if mutations which make the structure
more simple occur in the HA 5′-UTR.
For a pandemic outbreak, the H2N2 subtype needs a
mutation in the PB2 coding region, while the H7N9 sub-
type needs a mutation in the HA non-coding region.
Some selection pressure is usually applied on the coding
region. The coding region varies less frequently than the
non-coding region [30]. Thus, the H7N9 subtype is the
most dangerous AIV.
Fig. 3 Secondary structures and energies of the HA 5′-UTR of the Singapore/1/57(H2N2), Aichi/2-MA/1968(H3N2), and Jiangsu/2/2013(H7N9)
site-mutant variants (energy unit is kcal/mol)
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In vitro coupled transcription/translation assay with
representative HA 5′-UTR sequences
Seven representative 40 bp 5′-UTR sequences were
introduced between the T7 promoter and the Luciferase
template, and then into the TNT® T7 Coupled Reticulo-
cyte Lysate System. An HA 5′-UTR with a higher energy
(simpler structure) resulted in a higher translation effi-
ciency. For example, luciferase activity of the construct
of the Singapore/1/1957(H2N2) subtype for the mutations
-36G→C and -29U→A HA 5′-UTR (8.61 kcal) was
almost 10 times of that of the Rock Pigeon/Vietnam/6/
2009(H9N2) subtype HA 5′-UTR (−1.09 kcal) (see Fig. 4).
In vitro coupled transcription/translation assay proved the
above calculations.
Phylogenetic analysis
Phylogenetic trees constructed on the basis of HA and
PB2 proteins (see Additional file 2: Figure S1) and HA
5′-UTR (see Additional file 2: Figure S2) only show evo-
lutionary cues without reflecting pathogenicity/transmis-
sibility. They clustered mainly according to the species,
but not around the key mutation sites or structure ener-
gies. The PB2 proteins didn’t cluster fully according to
the species, indicating some possible reassortments (see
Additional file 2: Figure S1). Some key mutations deter-
mine host type and viral replication efficiency, but
cannot alter the phylogenetic tree, indicating that they
may just be accidental events in AIV’s evolutionary his-
tory. In other words, pandemic and highly pathogenic
AIVs may appear by chance. Regardless of whether a
reassortment occurs, if the variation rate in the AIV pool
is constant (mutations that happen in mammal hosts
cannot be transferred back to the bird AIV pool), high-
virulent strains of influenza should appear periodically
independent of human infections. The coincidence of
HA which can infect humans, human-replicable PB2,
and highly energized HA 5′-UTR by certain mutations
may happen after a certain time. The AIV pool size and
its actual variation rate remain unknown, but based on
other outbreaks (1918 H1N1, 1957 H2N2, 1968 H3N2,
2005 H5N1, 2009 H1N1, and 2013 H7N9), we can infer
that the period might be about 40–50 years. Thus, one
or two highly pathogenic strains might emerge in the
next two to three years. This assumption aligns with the
fact that all potential human infections and respiratory
droplet transmissions are born within the viruses them-
selves, but not after they have already infected mammal
hosts.
Discussion
Influenza viruses of avian origins preferentially bind to
α-2,3–linked SA receptors, whereas human influenza
Fig. 4 In vitro coupled transcription/translation assay with representative HA 5′-UTR sequences. Seven 40 bp 5′-UTR sequences (including two
nucleotide substitution variants) were introduced between the T7 promoter and the Luciferase template, and then the in vitro transcription/
translation coupled reaction was performed using the TNT® T7 Coupled Reticulocyte Lysate System. Luciferase activity of the control construct
(T7 promoter – Luciferase fusion) was normalized at 100 relative units
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viruses recognize α-2,6–linked SA receptors. In humans,
the α-2,6–linked SA receptors are predominantly present
in the upper respiratory tract (URT), and the α-2,3–linked
SA receptors are mainly present in the lower respiratory
tract. In chickens and other birds, α-2,3–linked SAs dom-
inate, yet both α-2,3–linked and α-2,6–linked SAs are
present all over the respiratory and enteric tracts [3–6].
The differences in receptor distribution between humans
and avian species are thought to determine the host re-
striction of influenza A viruses. Therefore, the switch in
receptor specificity from avian α-2,3–linked SA to human
α-2,6–linked SA is the most important requirement for
efficient human-to-human transmission. Besides a switch
in receptor specificity to facilitate infection of cells in the
URT, increased virus production in the human URT and
an efficient release of virus particles from the respiratory
tract to yield airborne virus may also be required. Muta-
tions in PB2 may help AIVs to be replicated efficiently at
the same temperature as in the human URT [11–14]. In
this paper, we suggest that the simplicity of the secondary
structure of 5′-UTR of the HA gene determines its pro-
tein translation efficiency and the overall virus replication
rate. We still do not know whether mutations in PB2 or
highly energized HA 5′-UTR are more important for
efficient replication in the human URT. Either might be
enough for limited human-to-human transmission. So if
the lower-temperature-activated PB2 and the highly ener-
gized HA 5′-UTR form at the same time, it may be a
signal for a pandemic outbreak.
The highest energy of AIV HA 5′-UTR may theoretic-
ally reach 8.61 kcal, but energies of naturally occurring
viruses are never greater than 5.0 kcal. A simplistic
structure of HA 5′-UTR may result in excessive virus
replication, leading to a quick death of the host (too
soon to spread the virus), which is adverse to virus
transmission. In addition, a balance between the proper-
ties endowed by HA and NA may be required to gener-
ate single particles. Imbalance of HA and NA tends to
form virus aggregates [31].
There are similarities and differences between pathogen-
icity and transmissibility. The human immune system is
familiar with seasonal flu viruses, such as H1N1 and
H2N2, so the mortality rates of these strains are relatively
low. On the contrary, unfamiliar viruses originating in
poultry may cause a high mortality rate because the infec-
tion of an unfamiliar virus may set off a cytokine storm,
resulting in a hyperimmune response to the virus and
excessive cell death [32, 33]. Besides familiarity, another
key factor determining pathogenicity is viral replication
efficiency. Excessive viral replication may result in an
excessive immune response, leading to a quick death.
For example, the Netherlands/219/2003(H7N7) and the
Hong Kong/470129/2013(H7N9) subtypes, two H7-type
viruses, share a similarity of 96.8 %. However, a PB2-627K
mutation as well as a much higher energized HA 5′-UTR
have been observed in the latter (see Additional file 2:
Table S2), meaning that the 2013 H7N9 subtype may be
more virulent. The South Carolina/1/1918(H1N1) and the
Nagasaki/07 N020/2008(H1N1) subtypes share a similar-
ity of 88.9 %. The HA-160A and PB2-627K mutations
have been observed in both these subtypes. However, the
Nagasaki/07 N020/2008(H1N1) subtype is not as virulent
and pandemic as the 1918 Spanish flu. One reason may be
that the human immune system has become familiar with
H1N1 viruses. Alternatively, the original 1918 H1N1 HA
5′-UTR may have an extraordinarily high energy (real
sequence is not available).
Fig. 5 The analogy between lock and key and AIV pathogenicity
and transmissibility. The human α-2,6-linked SA is like a lock and an
AIV is like a key. The HA-160A/186V/226L (or other) and PB2-627K
mutations are like the two teeth of the key. The HA 5′-UTR energy is
like the handle of the key, the size of which determines the key’s
twisting force. The depth of the red color shows the virulence level.
Question marks denote that the original HA 5′-UTR sequences were
not available
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Conclusion
In summary, we can make the following analogy: the
human α-2,6-linked SA is like a lock and an AIV is like
a key. The HA-160A/226L and the PB2-627K mutations
are like two teeth of the key. The energy of the HA 5′-
UTR is like the handle of the key, the size of which
determines the key’s twisting force (replication rate of
the virus). Different AIVs have different teeth and differ-
ent handle sizes. Viruses with both the HA-160A/226L
and PB2-627K mutations and highly energized HA 5′-
UTR may result in a pandemic (see Fig. 5).
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